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Semi-Competitive Elections at
Township Level in Sichuan Province
These attempts to win back people’s trust and support have been
developed since 1995.
Lai Hairong
1 In  late  2001 to  early  2002,  about  2000 townships  in  Sichuan province implemented
semi-competitive  elections  1,  which  was  a  great  development  concerning  political
restructuring  in  China.  Township  level  is  the  fifth  level  among  the  six  levels  of
authorities  in  China:  the  centre  at  the  top  (zhongyang),  32  provinces  (sheng)  at  the
second level,  333 prefectures (diqu)  at the third,  2,861 counties (xian)  at  the fourth,
about 43,500 townships (xiang zhen) at the fifth, and about 800,000 villages (cun) at the
bottom 2. This article tries to examine the development of these elections, its causes,
and its impacts on the evolution of the Party-state system at lower levels in China,
especially in the province of Sichuan 3. It is based on fieldwork carried out across this
province, mainly in the first half of 2002. The provincial authority, three prefecture
authorities, four county authorities, and ten townships in Sichuan were visited 4.  To
make  a  comparison,  the  author  visited  also  Shenzhen  in  Guangdong  province  in
February  2002:  there,  semi-competitive  elections  were  implemented  at  Dapeng
township in 1999. However, in 2002 when township authorities were supposed to be re-
elected, Shenzhen brought a halt to the experiment. Interviews were also carried out in
Wuxi prefecture in Jiangsu province where semi-competitive elections had never been
implemented (see Table 1).
2 Besides  fieldwork  in  Sichuan  and  other  provinces,  some  cadres  with  the  central
authorities were interviewed, which helped the author gain a better overview on semi-
competitive  elections  in  townships  across  the  country.  In  addition,  other  research
projects in which the author was involved 5 and existing literature on rural issues in
China 6 also provided important and useful information. 
3 First,  this  article  will  present  a  picture  of  the  development  of  semi-competitive
elections at township level in Sichuan province, and briefly in China as well since 1995,
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when the first such elections took place. It will then look at how theses elections came
to be and the impact they have had. 
4 By the end of  April  2002,  elections  at  township level  in  Sichuan were concluded 7.
According to the statistics provided by a provincial Party organ, 40% of the townships—
more than 2,000 townships, implemented semi-competitive elections. Elections were
held  for  positions  of  township  vice-governor  and  governor,  and  in  some  cases,
township Party vice-secretary and Party secretary. There are a total 16,000 leadership
positions in township governments in Sichuan 8. According to the same statistics, one-
third  of  the  positions—about  5,000  township  governors  and  vice-governors—were
competitively elected 9.
5 The first township semi-competitive elections took place in 1995 in Sichuan. Since then,
the number of township semi-competitive elections have steadily increased. Township
positions open to semi-competitive elections also spread steadily to higher ranks (see
Table  2).  The  author  went  to  four  sites:  Shizhong  county  (Suining  prefecture)
implemented semi-competitive elections for a township governor and nine township
vice-governor  positions;  Ya'an  prefecture  for  all  township  positions  in  all  its  175
townships; Nanbu county (Nanchong prefecture) for 43 township governors and 201
township vice-governor positions; Bazhong prefecture for all township positions in all
its 284 townships.
6 Table 1 : Sites and positions interviewed
NB: Figures in this table represent the number of interviewees at given positions.
* Shenzhen is a vice-province (fushengji shi).
** Interviews with incumbent township governor and his rival in the election. 
*** Interview with a vice-governor.
7 These elections were not evenly distributed across the province.  Table 3 shows the
number and ratio of  townships that implemented semi-competitive elections in the
four sites of the present study. Compared to the average ratio—40% of the townships—
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that  implemented  semi-competitive  elections  across  the  province,  real  ratios  were
extremely different. Interviews at provincial level confirmed that in some places, for
example  in  Chengdu  prefecture,  the  ratio  of  townships  that  implemented  semi-
competitive elections to the total number of townships within the prefecture was far
less  than 30%.  In  some counties  within  the  prefecture,  only  one  or  two townships
implemented semi-competitive elections 10.
8 This uneven distribution was sharper when examined nationwide. Compared to other
provinces,  Sichuan is  the  only  province  in  which township semi-elections  gained a
considerable  momentum  11.  In  other  provinces,  there  were  very  few  and  scattered
township semi-competitive elections. In 1998-99, the best-known was the election at
Dapeng township (Shenzhen,  Guangdong province)  12.  In the same year,  there were
elections at a township in Xincai county, Henan province 13, and in a few townships in
Putian prefecture and Longyan prefecture, Fujian province 14.
9 In 2001-2, the best-known in provinces other than Sichuan was an election for Party
secretary at  Yangji  township (Jingshan county,  Hubei province) 15.  There have been
other,  less  publicised  elections:  12  for  township  governors  at  Xianning  prefecture,
Hubei province 16; one for township vice-governor at Gongcheng township (Gongcheng
Yao nationality autonomous county in Guangxi) 17, and two others: one for township
governor at Qing township (Guiyang prefecture, Guizhou province) 18 and another at a
township within Jilin province 19. Except for these, the author did not find any other
reports on township semi-competitive elections in other provinces than Sichuan.
10 However, this is not the exact picture of what is happening across the country in terms
of the development of township semi-competitive elections. Since the township semi-
competitive election is, so far, an innovation, and is not widely accepted within the
system 20,  some localities  conceal  the events  both from higher  levels  and from the
public. Even if they did not, it is still likely that some semi-competitive elections will
remain  unknown  to  the  public  due  to  two  factors.  One  is  that  as  information  is
forwarded through the administrative levels,  a  critical  stance at  different  stages to
semi-competitive elections may gradually annihilate innovative elements. The other is
that  the  centre  and/or  the  32  provinces  have  to  deal  with  tens  of  thousands  of
townships, and so with tens of thousands of issues. Therefore as long as a new practice
does not greatly shake the system or engender any great impact on the society it may
remain unknown to the public 21. Thus, the elections known of in provinces other than
Sichuan do not provide a complete picture.
11 In the traditional practice of township elections, positions such as township governor,
vice-governor are at county Party committee’s nomenklatura—in Chinese terminology,
cadre  management  system.  This  means,  that  it  is  the  county  Party  committee,  in
practice the standing committee of the county Party committee (consisting of about
five to nine members) that decides on the candidates for each position in the township.
The decisions are then forwarded to township Party committees and through them to
township people’s congresses that should decide on the candidates 22. Since members of
township  peoples’  congresses  are  also  at  the  township  Party  committees’
nomenklatura,  there  is  little  chance  for  candidates  suggested  by  the  Party  to  be
opposed by members of people’s congress.
12 The new practice introduced competition to township elections by adding an open self-
nomination.  It  also added a voting procedure by an enlarged electoral  college—say,
primary election—at each township before the county Party committee would select
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from among them the candidates for township positions. “Self-nomination” is not the
only way of making nomination since local authorities encouraged primary candidates
to be nominated both by non-Party temporary group of residents, and by individuals
themselves.  But  in  fact,  due  to  the  underdeveloped  civil  society  or  horizontal
connections  among  people,  cases  of  primary  candidates  nominated  by  groups  of
residents  were  rare.  “Self-nomination”  turned  out  to  be  the  dominant  way  of
nominating primary candidates. The “enlarged electoral college” usually includes a few
(five to ten) county cadres, all members of township people’s congress, all township
government  staff,  all  village  main  cadres  (village  Party  secretaries,  village
commissioners),  and  some  resident  representatives  who  are  basically  selected  by
village cadres. In the old practice, township people’s congress consisting of about 35 to
45  representatives  is  the  electoral  college.  In  the  new  one,  the  enlarged  electoral
college consisted of about 150 to 300 people.
13 After primary candidates have been voted by the enlarged electoral college, usually the
one who got maximum votes would be automatically  accepted by the county Party
committee  as  the  formal  and  final  candidate  to  be  passed  to  the  township  Party
committee, through it to township people’s congress, and to be elected to the given
position 23. Generally, before voting, each candidate is required to give a speech about
his/her possible programme for the position and defend his/her programme in front of
the enlarged electoral  college.  In previous practice there were no such interactions
between candidates and electors. Very often, electors voted for candidates who they
did not even know.
14 Thus,  a  semi-open  and  semi-competitive  primary  election  has  been  added  to  the
previous closed election. The primary was emphasised, and in some cases competition
was  fierce.  In  addition,  residents’  participation  in  the  township  elections  has  also
increased with the added voting procedure by the enlarged electoral college.
15 Tables 4, 5 and 6 show that quite a large number of primary candidates run for each
position, which was impossible when candidates were decided by closed meetings by
the five to nine member standing committee of county Party committees.
16 No  detailed  statistics  were  available  in  Ya’an  prefecture.  But  all  township  main
positions—governor, vice-governors, Party secretaries, and Party vice-secretary—were
open to semi-competitive elections at all of the 175 townships within the prefecture.
There were a total 1,040 positions 24, and 2,103 self-nominated primary candidates 25.
17 When there were too many self-nominated primary candidates, a written exam was
held by the election commission 26 to reduce the number of candidates who would later
have  to  defend  their  programmes  in  front  of  the  enlarged  electoral  college.  For
example,  in  Suining  prefecture,  as  shown in  Table  4,  with  the  exception  of  Buyun
township, there were an average 30 people competing for each position. The election
commission organised a written exam. The top six primary candidates went forward to
the next round. Questions asked in the exams were basically the central authority’s
policy  on  rural  issues,  related  laws  and  regulations,  agriculture  and  economic
development, and so on.
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Table 2 : Evolution of townships semi-competitive elections in Sichuan 
NB: * Incomplete statistics. According to the provincial authorities, the ﬁrst semi-competitive elections
at township level took place in 1995-96. About 10 townships have implemented semi-competitive
elections for township vice-governor. 
** Incomplete statistics. 
*** In 2001-2, a large number of townships in Sichuan held semi-competitive elections. Detailed data
on which townships implemented competitive elections for what positions were not available. 
Source: Edited by the author based on his interviews
18 Nanbu county authority also organised such exams. Their purpose was not to reduce
the number of candidates, but rather to ensure that candidates had basic knowledge
about political and economic life in rural areas. Written exams were not held in other
regions.  In  Ya’an prefecture and Bazhong prefecture,  pre-selection through written
exams was considered unnecessary 27.
19 That people unknown to the closed group of county Party leadership began to be able
to take part in competition for township governors and even Party secretaries, did not
mean free elections. Competitive primary elections were followed by highly controlled
final elections. And elections had further prescribed constraints: 1) competitors had to
be  cadres  28 of  Party  and state  apparatus  (with  the  exception  of  Buyun township),
ordinary citizens had no access  to nomination;  2)  election campaign was forbidden
(with  the  exception  of  Buyun  township);  3)  upper  age  limits  were  set;  4)  lower
education limits were imposed.
20 As to the first point, in the localities where the author conducted the fieldwork, only
cadres at county authority, township authority, and “three positions” at village level
could  participate  in  competing  for  positions  of  township  governor  and  Party
secretaries.  “Three  positions”  at  village  level  refers  to  the  head  of  the  villager
committee, village Party secretary, and village accountant. They are not paid from the
state budgetary fund, but obtain a small amount of subsidies from township’s extra-
and/or  off-budgetary  funds.  They  are  not  formal  cadres  in  the  Chinese  context.
However,  they  are  the  most  important  institutionalised  links  between  ordinary
residents in villages and township authorities. 
21 There were variants in regulations setting out which positions cadres were allowed to
participate. For example, in Shizhong county (with the exception of Buyun township),
in Nanbu county, and in Bazhong prefecture, only township vice-governors, township
Party vice-secretaries, and cadres at this rank were allowed to compete for positions of
township governor and township Party secretary. Ordinary cadres could only compete
for positions of township vice-governor and township Party vice-secretary. In Ya’an
prefecture  and  Buyun  township,  competition  and  openness  in  the  elections  were
greatly increased. In Ya’an prefecture, there were no requirements on ranks: any cadre
was allowed to compete as primary candidate for any township position. At Buyun,
even  ordinary  citizens  could  be  primary  candidates  for  the  position  of  township
governor.
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22 Competitive elections at township level thus differed from the old way of appointing
township governors by county Party committee. Nevertheless, except in one township,
no  ordinary  citizen  has  been  elected  township  governor  and/or  vice-governor.
Competitive elections in Sichuan’s townships did not change the discrepancy between
people outside the Party-state network and those inside.
23 Secondly,  though  all  primary  candidates,  according  to  election  regulations,  were
required to give speeches and defend their programme in front of an enlarged electoral
college.  Campaigns  were  forbidden  29.  Local  cadres  reported  that  the  reason  for
forbidding campaigns was to prevent election fraud. Campaigns were considered an
instrument by which primary candidates could corrupt electors. Convincing or not, the
forbidding of campaigns reduced greatly the intensity of competition and openness.
24 The third constraint is an upper age limit for primary candidates. As shown in Table 7,
this  limit  is  quite  low.  This  criterion  is  the  opposite  of  that  usually  seen  in  other
countries:  election  regulations  generally  set  a  minimum  age  for  candidates  for
positions in authorities to ensure sufficient social experience and political maturity.
The last constraint worth mention is the requirement for primary candidates to be
educated to a high level 30 (see Table 8).
25 Within the four study sites, Shizhong county, Nanbu county and Bazhong prefecture
had implemented two, and in a few cases even three, semi-competitive township-level
elections 31. As Ya’an prefecture held such elections for the first time in 2001-2, we will
examine only the first three sites.
26 In  Shizhong  county  (Suining  prefecture)  in  2001-2,  semi-competitive  township
elections were implemented for the second time. Compared to those in 1998-99, there
was greater openness and competition was more intense 32. In 1998-99, according to the
regulations issued by Shizhong county authority, primary candidates had to be cadres
working  within  the  county.  In  2001-2,  cadres  working  in  the  other  three  counties
within the prefecture could also be nominated. This new measure expanded the sources
and  the  numbers  of  competitors  for  each  position,  (see  Table  4),  and  intensified
competition.
27 In Bazhong prefecture, township semi-competitive elections were implemented for the
third time in 2001-2 at some of its townships. Local cadres in charge of appointments
reported that a tendency of increasing openness and intensifying competition could be
detected. Initially, both cadres and ordinary citizens believed that the new practice was
merely  a  formality.  When  unexpected  results  emerged  with  the  continuous
implementation of  competitive elections,  public  interest  grew. More cadres directly
and ordinary citizens indirectly took part in the semi-competitive elections. 
28 Positive  developments  sometimes paralleled negative.  Semi-competitive  elections  in
Buyun township were implemented in late 1998 for the first time, and in late 2001 the
second time.  Buyun township is  always mentioned as  an exceptional  case.  It  was a
direct election voted in by all township residents above the age of 18, rather than an
indirect election where only the township people’s congress had a vote. There was no
restriction on the origin of those nominated for candidates. Campaigning was allowed.
29 However, the township or county authorities did not give up all means of monitoring
Buyun’s  elections.  The  Party  could  still  influence  elections  through  a  preliminary
election in which an enlarged electoral college 33 voted. This interim process played an
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important  role  in  decreasing  the  intensity  of  competition  when  semi-competitive
elections were implemented for the second time in 2001.
30 In 1998 at Buyun township 16 persons were nominated as primary candidates. One of
these  was  nominated  by  the  township  Party  committee  (actually  the  county  Party
committee) and was not required to go through the voting process of the enlarged
electoral  college.  The  college  consisted  of  161  persons  who  were  township  cadres,
village  cadres,  and  resident  representatives  selected  by  village  cadres.  The  Party
committee’s delegate automatically went forward and had to compete with the two
candidates elected by the enlarged college.
31 From  December  20th  to  28th,  the  three  candidates  waged  intense  campaigns  34.
Thirteen debates were held during that week. 20,000 (Buyun township had a voting
population of 6,200 in 1998 35) heard the debates. 650 asked questions to the candidates
36.  At  last,  the candidate  nominated by the Party  committee  won the election by a
narrow margin. He got 50.4% of the votes 37.
32 In  2001,  a  semi-competitive  election  was  implemented  again  for  the  position  of
township  governor.  But  intensity  of  competition  was  greatly  decreased.  In  2000,
Buyun’s  superior  authority,  Shizhong  county  Party  leadership  was  reshuffled.  The
former  Party  secretary  who  was  enthusiastic  about  implementing  township  semi-
competitive election was shifted to another position outside the county. The new Party
secretary of  Shizhong county was ambivalent about holding the elections again.  He
delayed the decision until the deadline. By the time he made a decision, cadre and
residents’ hopes were already dampened 38. 
 
Table 3 :Proportion of semi-competitive elections in the four areas of fieldwork
Source: Edited by the author based on archives obtained during ﬁeldwork study.
 
Table 4 : Number of self-nominated primary candidates for a township vice-governor position in
2002 in Shizhong county
Source: Organisation Department of Suining Party committee
33 Of similar importance was that in the 2001 election,  the incumbent cadre sought a
second term in the position of township governor. He had been nominated by the Party
and did not have to go through the selection process. Since he was also a newcomer, he
did  not  have  much  influence  on  the  selection  process.  At  the  2001  election,  the
incumbent township governor and other primary candidates were all put to the vote by
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the enlarged electoral college. The enlarged college, consisting of township and village
cadres and voter representatives selected by village cadres, on whom the incumbent
township governor had a strong influence, elected two candidates for the next step—
competing for the votes of the five thousand voters 39. The two successful candidates
were the incumbent township governor and an ordinary cadre working at the same
township—therefore subordinate of the incumbent governor. The township’s peasants
without  exception  reported  that  the  one  who  was  most  likely  to  challenge  the
incumbent was one of those defeated. It was also said that the incumbent, who had a
significant influence on the enlarged electoral college, managed to have his strongest
rival pushed out and a weak candidate allowed through 40.  Since the incumbent was
obviously in a much better position than his rival, many people took it for granted that
the incumbent would win the election. The intensity of competition decreased greatly.
Only six debates were held. Interviewed peasants reported that, the audience at the
debates was much smaller than at the 1998 election. The intensity of the debates was
much weaker 41. The incumbent won the election 42.
34 Buyun township’s semi-competitive election was not the only case where openness and
intensity of competition declined. This also happened in Nanbu county. In 1998, Nanbu
county implemented semi-competitive elections for the first time in 79 townships for
178 township vice-governor positions. Elections that year simply required that the one
who gained the most votes from the enlarged electoral college 43 would be accepted as
formal candidates by the county Party committee.  Within the electoral  college,  the
votes of the county leadership were weighted 40% against the 60% of other electors 44.
35 In  2001,  Nanbu  county  authority  implemented  semi-competitive  elections  at  all  its
townships 45 for positions of 200 township vice-governors and 43 township governors.
By that time regulations had changed. In the enlarged electoral colleges, the weight of
county leadership increased to 60% against the 40% for others 46.  As a consequence,
openness and intensity of competition declined. The practice in the semi-competitive
elections in these townships to an extent the reverse of practice previously. 
36 As mentioned, the initiators of township semi-competitive elections were county Party
committees, and in some cases, prefecture Party committees. County and/or prefecture
Party committees presented the reform ideas, designed operative procedures for the
primary elections, organised and supervised each step of the primary elections. They
were the ones who confirmed the results of the primary elections and concluded the
final elections. In other words, the whole procedure was led, regulated and monitored
through  direct  participation  of  county  and/or  prefecture  Party  committees.  The
increase  and  decrease  of  openness  and  intensity  of  competition,  the  increase  and
decrease  of  the  number  of  townships  open  to  semi-competitive  elections,  and
spreading of semi-competitive elections to positions of higher ranks were all decided
by  county  and/or  prefecture  Party  committees.  The  management  of  the  unusual
elections smoothly fit into the routine operation of the Chinese Party-state, since it is
the county Party committee that holds the nomenklatura responsibility over township
positions  47.  It  is  the  task  of  the  county  Party  committee,  or  in  some  cases,  of  its
immediate superior to decide how to appoint cadres to township positions, provided
the way of appointment does not violate the respective principles set by the central
Party  committee.  Therefore,  reasons  for  the  development  of  township  semi-
competitive elections should first and foremost be found by examining county and/or
prefecture Party committee motivations.
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37 On examining primarily the motivations of county and prefecture authorities it was
significant that none of the semi-competitive elections was reported to have resulted
from any demand for them from ordinary citizens 48. During my fieldwork, cadres of
different county and prefecture authorities reported different motivations. 
38 In  all  the  counties  and  prefectures  the  author  visited,  local  cadres  said  that  the
implementation  of  competitive  elections  was  to  enforce  people’s  voting  rights  as
stipulated in the Constitution. Though the reforms increased the transparency of the
system as well as people’s participation in the political process, and we may agree that
the aim of the organisers might have implied the enforcement of people’s rights, these
motivations do not explain the restrictions, setbacks, reversals, etc. 
39 In an interview on December 29th 2001, Mrs Zhang Jingmin, the former Party secretary
of  Shizhong county,  who initiated the first  township competitive  elections in  1998,
explained: “Shortly after I  was promoted to county Party secretary,  corruption was
discovered in the Xinqiao and Baoshi townships of cadres embezzling money collected
from peasants. The peasants’ trust in cadres and township governments was in crisis. I
became  determined  to  carry  out  some  reform  experiments—to  implement  semi-
competitive  elections  for  governor  at  Baoshi  township  and  for  Party  secretary  at
Xinqiao  township,  to  win  back  the  people’s  trust  in  and  support  for  the  township
authorities” 49.
 
Table 5 : Primary candidates for township semi-competitive elections in Nanbu county 
Source: Edited by the author according to Nanbu xian xiangzhenzhang houxuanren gongkai jingzheng
ziliao huibian (Collected Material on Semi-Competitive Elections for Candidates for Township
Governors and Vice-governors in Nanbu County), Organisation Department of Nanbu county Party
committee, November 2001.
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Table 6 :Primary candidates for township semi-competitive elections in Bazhong prefecture
NB: Semi-competitive elections in townships in Bazhong prefecture were not only implemented for the
positions of township governor and vice-governor, but also for township Party secretary and vice-
secretary. When ﬁeldwork was carried out there in January, semi-competitive elections were only held
in part of the townships. Therefore, statistics in the above table are incomplete. According to cadres in
Bazhong, all positions at all the 285 townships within the prefecture would be elected in a semi-
competitive way in early 2002, which was conﬁrmed by interviews with provincial level in April 2002.
However, interviews at provincial level did not provide accurate ﬁgures.
Source: Edited by the author according to the related reports by local authorities in Bazhong.
40 Mrs Zhang’s account confirmed the story told by an earlier interviewee in the county.
In  September  2001  in  Shizhong  county,  a  county  vice-governor  said  that,  after
corruption at Xinqiao and Baoshi townships was uncovered, peasants took direct action
against township cadres. They refused to pay taxes, and to make any contribution to
projects initiated by the township authorities. Authorities at those two townships were
hardly able to do their jobs 50. The county Party committee envisaged that, through the
implementation  of  semi-competitive  elections,  peasants  would  become  involved  in
choosing the leadership and therefore accept the new leadership elected with more
direct and/or indirect peasant participation.
41 At Bazhong prefecture, a similar political crisis caused by financial problems with the
township authorities seemed to be the driving force behind the implementation of
semi-competitive  elections.  Cadres  of  Bazhong  prefecture  complained  fiercely  but
unsuccessfully about the huge amount of debt that township authorities and villages
had  51.  According  to  an  account  published  in  the  magazine  issued  by  prefecture
authority,  in  one region within the prefecture,  township debts  to  peasants  totalled
112% of the township revenues in 2000 52. According to the same report, “since village
authorities and  township  authorities  never  pay  debts  due,  authorities  are  losing
respect.  Peasants  consider  township  authorities  liars.  Debtors  come  every  day
demanding payments. Cadres at townships and villages are also frustrated: they have
not  received their  salaries  for  months;  they cannot  focus  on jobs  due for  they are
overburdened by debtors. Many cadres give up jobs at authorities and migrate to other
regions” 53.
42 The Bazhong prefecture authority saw township semi-competitive elections as a way of
solving the problems. As stated in a Party archive 54, prefecture and county authorities
hoped that  competitive  elections  would  provide  cadres  for  township positions  who
were capable of handling the problems, were trusted by peasants, and were willing to
work in rural areas.
43 In  Nanbu  county, township  semi-competitive  elections  seemed  to  result  from  two
pressures—peasant protests against township cadres increased in the 1990s, and cadres
at  county  reported  that  groups  of  peasants  complained  to  higher  levels  about  the
misery imposed on them by the township cadres. In some cases, peasants organised sit-
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ins in front of the county Party committee office building, demanding that the county
authority dismiss some township cadres 55. Peasant resentment reached above county
level.  In  1996,  township  people’s  congresses  rejected  four  from  among  the  14
candidates  nominated  by  the  county  Party  committee.  This  behaviour  was
unprecedented 56. Semi-competitive elections through which participation of peasants
was  indirectly  increased,  and  which  allowed  ordinary  cadres  a  stronger  say  on
appointing main cadres were seen as a way to ease resentment. 
44 The other pressure was to increase the township authorities’ ability to raise extra funds
for investment. Raising these funds was imperative, due to a big investment project led
by the county authority. Nanbu county authority decided on October 6th 1997 to build a
power station. Costs amounted to 650 million yuan, a huge sum for a county in western
China. The county authority did not have the resources for the project. And, since it
was  not  a  project  included  in  the  state  economic  development  plan,  there  was  no
chance of support from higher levels. They had to rely on “internal” resources. The
county Party secretary interpreted the situation the following way: “in Nanbu county,
economic  life  in  the  1990s  changed  enormously.  The  market  has  been  playing  an
increasing role. As such, the township authorities need cadres with new talents, new
approaches,  and  new  skills  to  solve  the  problems  facing  us”  57.  Semi-competitive
elections well fit those aims. 
45 This  was  confirmed  by  an  interview  with  the  vice-director  of  the  organisation
department  of  Nanbu county  Party  committee:  “With  the  change  in  economic  life,
cadres appointed in the traditional way could not adjust to the new situation. They
generally  were  too  old,  and  had  old-style  thinking;  they  typically  were  good  at
accumulating guanxi (connections) with higher-ranking officials,  rather than dealing
with  the  market.  Moreover,  promotion  based  on  guanxi negatively  affected  other
cadres’ initiative” 58. The time had come to change the appointment system. Township
semi-competitive elections were considered as an alternative.
46 In Ya’an prefecture, there was little resentment from peasants as seen in other areas
and raising extra funds seemed to be the sole driving force for the elections. Initiator of
the reform project—Mr Wei Hong, the then Party secretary of Ya’an prefecture Party
committee—explained:  “We  expect  that  ordinary  citizens’  political  enthusiasm  and
participation  brought  about  by  the  reform  (of  competitive  elections  at  townships)
would engender positive achievements for (economic and social) development in rural
areas, which is what the Party has been hoping for for years” 59. 
47 A top priority in Ya’an prefecture was to greatly improve infrastructure in rural areas.
However, in Ya’an prefecture, both township, county and prefecture authorities were
short  of  resources.  Unless  covered by  extra  resources  from outside  the  Party-state
structure,  there was no hope of  achieving the goal.  Leadership appointed by upper
levels did not have initiative to raise funds. Those in other positions, who would have
initiatives,  had  poor  chances  of  promotion  due  to  the  closed  nature  of  cadre
appointments. Moreover, the authorities were alienated from their citizens. Therefore,
both in Ya’an prefecture and partly in Nanbu county, ambitious investment projects
confronted by the lack of financial background drove county and prefecture authorities
to implement township semi-competitive elections, in order to involve citizens both in
the process and in resource contribution 60.
48 Since  the  purpose  for  the  semi-competitive  elections  was  to  relieve  the  township
authority from crisis,  or to increase the township authority’s ability to attain extra
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resources, the aim of fundamental systemic change was out of the question 61. Semi-
competitive elections at township level in China, especially in Sichuan, were rather a
self-adjustment to the Party-state system. Restrictions on primary candidates’ origins,
on campaigns, on electoral colleges, and the inclusion of channelling by pre-selection
into the traditional process, not speaking about the whole organisation and regulation
of  these  elections,  ensured  that  semi-competitive elections  would  not  break  the
boundary of the Party-state network.
49 In  addition,  the  restrictions  on  age  and education  seemed to  serve  the  purpose  of
replacing old cadres with young ones who were better equipped to navigate in the new
economic  and  social  life.  The  Chinese nomenklatura  seems  to  have  evolved  into  a
system in which cadre promotion is based on the length of a given cadre’s bureaucratic
life. However, length of bureaucratic life in many cases represents incompetence rather
than wisdom, especially when the possibility of acquiring resources within the network
is declining, and attaining sufficient resources from market is a pressing problem.
50 Interdependency between lack of resources and semi-competitive elections was also
underlined by another interview. According to local cadres, the immediate result of
semi-competitive elections at Baoshi township in 1998 was peasants’ full co-operation
in tax payment. Therefore, we can argue that in 2001, when a new round of elections
took  place,  a  deep  crisis  was  partially  relieved,  leading  the  county  authority  to
implement township semi-competitive elections with less intensity and openness.
51 A similar case worthy of note was in Shenzhen, Guangdong province. A township semi-
competitive election was initiated there in 1998 but was halted in 2001. The author’s
interviews in Shenzhen showed that the semi-competitive election at Dapeng township
was not aimed at any problems in particular 62. It was, according to local cadres and
citizens,  more  like  a  decoration  or  a  political  show.  Therefore,  when  the  issue  of
township semi-competitive elections became controversial 63, local cadres gave up the
new  practice.  In  other  words,  in  places  where  no  crisis  emerged,  township  semi-
competitive elections were vulnerable to critique and therefore were not sustained.
52 In Sichuan province, local authorities not only did not halt the reform started in the
mid-1990s,  but  instead  escalated  greatly  the  implementation  of  township  semi-
competitive  elections.  The  escalation,  according  to  cadres  at  provincial  level,  was
basically due to the fact that tensions between township authorities and residents were
much greater in Sichuan than in other provinces. Implementation of semi-competitive
elections at township level was badly needed even if controversial among cadres in the
central authority 64. Indeed, townships in Sichuan were in very deep crisis: county and
township  authorities  had  been  accumulating  huge  deficits  65,  peasants  were
increasingly  vocal  against  the  authorities  66,  both  peasants  and  cadres  had  been
yearning for investment and rapid economic development 67. 
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Table 7 :Upper age limit for primary candidates 
NB: *In Ya’an prefecture, if a primary candidate is an ordinary cadre, he/she should not be over 40; if
an incumbent township governor nominates himself/herself as a primary candidate for a second
term, he/she should not be over 45. 
**Ordinary cadres in Ya’an prefecture wishing to compete for township vice-governor should be
younger than 35; those who were already township vice-governor wishing to compete for the same
positions should not be over 40
Source: Regulations on township competitive elections issued in the above-mentioned four areas.
53 As  to  the  unevenness  in  terms  of  the  regional  distribution  of  township  semi-
competitive elections, differences emerged between provinces (e.g. Sichuan, Wuxi and
Shenzhen) and also within provinces (e.g. within Sichuan). For example, in rural areas
near Chengdu prefecture,  capital of  Sichuan,  township and county authorities  were
facing far fewer difficulties in raising revenues to cover their expenditures. Peasants
had more opportunity to make a good living due to the relative economic boom in and
closeness  to  the capital  city.  They did not  bother themselves  too much to monitor
township cadre behaviour. As a consequence, tensions in areas near Chengdu and some
other prosperous cities were lower than those in remote and relatively underdeveloped
areas.  This  picture  coincides  with  the  picture  that  a  much  larger  proportion  of
townships  in  remote  and relatively  underdeveloped prefectures  implemented semi-
competitive elections and a much smaller proportion of townships held elections in
Chengdu and similarly prosperous prefectures 68. In other words, the uneven regional
distribution of crisis and tensions parallel the uneven regional distribution of township
semi-competitive elections.
54 Did township semi-competitive elections bring change and if they did, what kind of
change did it bring and what impact did it have on the nomenklatura over township
and village  positions?  If  the  elections  changed the relations  between authorities  at
various levels, to what extent did they change: the relations between Party and state at
township level; and the relations between authorities, especially township authorities,
and ordinary residents?
55 As to the impact on the nomenklatura, the county Party committee’s nomenklatura
over  township  positions  is  still  there.  However,  with the  introduction of  the  semi-
competitive elections, the centralised power of the county Party committee’s standing
committee in making appointments for township positions is partially decentralised to
cadres at lower levels and even to a part of the residents 69.  In other words, county
Party  committee  nomenklatura  responsibility  over  township positions  was  partially
diffused. Bigger change was brought about by semi-competitive elections at township
level  on  the  township  Party  committee’s  nomenklatura  over  village  positions.  The
author’s  study  found  that  in  townships  where  semi-competitive  elections  were
implemented, village elections were organised in a freer and more open way. Township
authorities intervened less in village elections. In some cases, free elections were held.
Township Party committees did not have a pre-emptive plan for who should be elected
as heads of villager committees, showing township Party committee nomenklatura over
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village non-Party positions withdrawn. In some villages, Party secretary positions were
open to competitive elections in which not only ordinary Party members but also some
non-Party  residents  were  involved  in  the  voting.  In  these  cases,  township  Party
committee  nomenklatura  over  village  Party  positions  was  also  withdrawn.  In  some
other villages, the withdrawals were done in a more radical way. After heads of villager
committees were elected in a free and open way, in case the elected heads were Party
members they were automatically appointed as village Party secretaries; in case they
were not,  they would be asked to join the Party and then were appointed as Party
secretaries 70.
56 Concerning relations between Party and state at township level, a few changes were
reported. Institutionally, township governors elected in a semi-competitive way work
under  the  leadership  of  township  Party  committees.  However,  township  governors
emerging  from  semi-competitive  elections  “were  generally  more  self-confident”.
Meanwhile, “township Party secretaries showed them more respect”. “In a few cases,
competitively elected township governors pursued more power,  leading to conflicts
with township Party secretaries” 71.
57 The  impact  of  township  semi-competitive  elections  on  relations  between  county
authorities  and  township  authorities  is  more  complicated.  Different  cadres  made
various  assessments  of  this.  Interviewees  in  Ya’an  prefecture  and  Shizhong  county
believed  that  semi-competitive  elections  at  township  level  did  not  change  the
relationship  between  county  and  township  authorities.  Cadres  in  Nanbu  county
believed the contrary. Especially in 1998, when the “county Party did not monitor the
elections  sufficiently”,  “a  proportion  of  the  cadres  elected  in  townships  semi-
competitive  elections  began  to  be  passive  in  complying  with  directives  from  the
county” 72. Interviewees at provincial level confirmed that, after the implementation of
semi-competitive  elections  in  townships,  “county  authority  power  over  township
authorities decreased, and township authorities gained more autonomy.”
 
Table 8 : The minimum education requirement for primary candidates
NB: *In remote townships, the requirement for a minimum level of education could be decreased to
senior high school.
Source: Regulations on township competitive elections issued in the above-mentioned four areas.
58 Concerning the relationship between township authorities and ordinary citizens, the
interviewees  reported  bigger  changes.  Firstly,  “since  residents’  participation  in
selecting cadres increased, tensions between cadres and residents declined, relations
between cadres and residents were more harmonious”. Secondly, township authorities
were  more  motivated  and  more  under  pressure  to  increase  transparency  in
governmental affairs 73. Thirdly, in a few cases, “cadres emerged from semi-competitive
elections paid more attention to citizens’ and ordinary cadres’ wishes. In some cases,
when tasks  assigned  by  upper  levels  were  in  conflict  with  residents’  interests,  the
cadres sided with residents” 74.
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59 These changes were probably caused by the fact that in semi-competitive elections a
cadre’s  possibility  of  being  promoted  to  township  leadership  positions  was  greatly
influenced by the residents and ordinary cadres. In many townships, competition for
elector votes was intense. Precise data on how many cases there were of unexpected
results—in  local  cadres’  words,  “winners  previously  unknown  to  Party  committees
emerged from polls”—were not available. In Ya’an prefecture it was estimated that 20%
to 30% of winners were previously unknown to the standing committees of the county
Party committees. Estimation by cadres at provincial level was that one-third of the
winners  were  not  known  to  the  organisations  holding  cadre  responsibility  over
township  positions.  These  unexpected  winners  encouraged  more  cadres  to  respect
their colleagues and residents. On the other hand, unexpected election outcomes also
shocked some of the cadres who formerly only followed directives from higher levels.
In Ya’an prefecture, Party secretaries at two townships gave up competing as primary
candidates  after  calculating  that  they  could  not  gain  enough  votes  from  resident
representatives and ordinary cadres. By doing so, they in fact gave up the opportunity
of having a second term in the position. That township cadres were discouraged from
competing and the fact that they gave up leadership positions because of elections was
unprecedented.75
60 Less  dramatic  election  outcomes  could  also  have  an  impact.  For  example,  when  a
winner did not get the expected amount of ballots, he/she would also have to rethink
his/her policies. This was the case in Buyun township in 2001. At the 2001 election,
people had already taken it for granted that the incumbent township governor would
win  the  election.  The  incumbent  township  governor  was  in  such  an  advantageous
position compared to  his  rival,  that  some cadres,  including the incumbent himself,
thought that it would not be a success if he got less than 70% of the ballot 76. However,
the incumbent got less than 51% of the ballot. His apparently hopeless rival won more
than 49% of the vote. Among the 5,000 ballots, less than 100 votes separated them 77.
Cadres at county level believed that in the past three years, the incumbent in many
cases did not pay enough attention to residents’ opinions when making decisions. Some
of his  policies  were also implemented with little  transparency.  Thus he alienated a
large proportion of the residents. Voting for his rival was actually a protest against the
incumbent 78. 
61 All in all, township competitive elections, especially the unexpected outcomes, drove
township cadres to put more weight on residents’  opinions when making decisions.
They seemed driven to seek a new balance between compliance with the authorities at
higher levels and respect for residents’ interests. And the balance tipped slightly for
the residents with the implementation of township semi-competitive elections.
62 However,  this  was  only  one side  of  the  story.  Township semi-competitive  elections
were implemented at the next-to-lowest level within the whole Party-state. The system
was and is  still  there,  checking the unfolding of  the  impact  of  the  township semi-
competitive elections.  Probably the most powerful  factor in evaluating any possible
impact, is the unchanged parts of the nomenklatura. Appointment is only one part of
the  Party  committees’  four  major  jobs  concerning  cadre  responsibility.  Semi-
competitive  elections  at  township  level  changed  county  Party  committees’  way  of
appointing to township positions. However, the following three powers over township
cadres did not change: cadre review, cadre exchange, cadre demotion.
Semi-Competitive Elections at Township Level in Sichuan Province
China Perspectives, 51 | january-february 2004
15
63 For each position, the county Party committee would have a list  of  tasks that each
cadre  should  achieve.  This  list  of  tasks  also  stipulates  according  awards  and
punishments.  In  all  the  areas  the  author  visited,  county  Party  committees  without
exception gave township positions enormous tasks 79, which greatly reduced the room
for competitively elected cadres to manoeuvre. Especially, it made it very difficult for
elected  cadres  to  refrain  themselves  from  intervening  in  peasants’  economic  and
political lives, even if they wished to.
64 Cadre  exchanges  also  greatly  impeded the  unfolding  of  any  election  impact.  Cadre
exchange is an important part of the cadre management system in China 80. The county
Party committee has the right to and actually must constantly shift a cadre from one
position to another. In places where the author visited, cases of competitively elected
township cadres being shifted to other positions were reported 81.  Consequently,  by
disconnecting elected cadres from their constituents, any possible impact was impeded.
65 Cadre demotion is a power of veto held by county Party committees over township
cadres elected in a semi-competitive way. In this study’s research sites, no demotion of
competitively elected township cadres was reported so far. However, in other provinces
at  village level,  many cases of  township Party committees dismissing freely elected
heads of villagers committees have been reported 82. Similarly, competitively elected
township governors and/or Party secretaries were subject to the same demotions.
66 The  second  important  factor  hindering  any  impact  might  be  those  organisations
attached to township authorities but in the meanwhile under the direct supervision of
county authorities 83. Since these organisations were still under the direct supervision
of the county authorities, competitively elected township vice-governors, governors,
Party vice-secretaries, and Party secretaries had limited power over them 84. Room for
them to manoeuvre was further compressed. Thus, any effects that the competitive
elections might have had were impeded.
67 Semi-competitive elections in townships in Sichuan have grown steadily and swiftly
since  1995:  the  number  of  township  semi-competitive  elections  have  increased
enormously; positions opened to semi-competitive elections have also been spreading
from  vice-governor,  to  governor,  and  further  to  Party  vice-secretary  and  Party
secretary. Causes for this development involved the county Party committees’ hopes of
relieving townships from deep crisis. They envisaged that through semi-competitive
elections,  township  authorities  would  win  the  support  of  residents,  capable  cadres
would  be  put  into  suitable  positions,  and  extra  resources  would  be  absorbed  into
township budgets.
68 Impacts of these elections include a decentralisation and weakening of county Party
committees  appointment  responsibility  for  township  positions,  in  a  few  cases
abolishing  or  weakening  of  township  Party committee  nomenklatura  over  village
positions to a greater extent. Meanwhile township authorities gained more autonomy
from counties, and residents began to have a greater influence over township affairs.
69 However, the Party-state still prevails, and all its unchanged parts have been following
the unfolding of possible impacts brought about by the semi-competitive elections at
township level.
70 Moreover, the effects of this kind of election can be reversed to some extent, as we saw
with the decrease in openness and intensity of competition in the Buyun township, and
in Nanbu county. In the former, the county authority was less motivated to implement
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township semi-competitive elections once tensions were eased and pressures relieved.
In the latter,  local  cadres said that after the 1998 semi-competitive elections,  some
cadres  began to  pay  too  much attention to  ordinary  cadres’  and citizens’  interests
rather than  implementing  the  directives  of  the  county  authority  85.  To  ensure  the
county authority’s control over townships, the county Party committee decided to re-
weight the voting ratios, decreasing that of ordinary cadres and citizens and increasing
that of the county leadership.
71 However, reversion in some places would probably be out-weighted by a wide spread in
other  places.  In  2004-5  when  the  next  elections  are  held  in  rural  areas,  semi-
competitive  elections  might  spread  to  townships  across  the  country,  especially  in
western and northern China, in which a large proportion of township authorities are in
similar deep crisis as those in Sichuan. It seems rather a matter of how widely township
semi-competitive elections would spread and how intense the competition would be
than whether or not these elections will spread. Upper level officials have not been able
to contain crisis at township level, though they had wanted to and tried to. It might
also be the case, for the same reasons, that upper level authorities would not be able to
contain the spread of semi-competitive elections at township level, even if they want to
and  try  to.  Naturally,  if  higher-ranking  authorities  could  see  the  development  of
township  semi-competitive  elections  as  healthy  and  beneficial,  their  development
would be greatly facilitated.
NOTES
1. We use the term “semi-competitive elections” because these elections are far from
being free and competitive elections as one sees in many countries. 
2. See statistics announced by Ministry of Civil Affairs in 2001: http://www.mca.gov.cn/
news/news2001041601.html. Villages and townships have been under constant
restructuring. The general tendency in the 1990s was that number of townships
decreased. About 50,000 townships in the early 1990s were merged into less than 43,500
townships by the early 2000s. This is also the case for villages. However data
concerning the exact change in the number of villages were not available.
3. During the research, the author was fortunate to have help from many people. First
of all, Dr Maria Csanadi at the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences. Secondly, the author’s colleagues at the China Center for Comparative Politics
& Economics. Cadres at local Party and state organisations, especially those in Sichuan,
helped a lot during the field work. Sarah Cook’ program at Ford Foundation’s Beijing
office provided financial support for the field works part. The author also benefited a
lot from the stimulating academic environment of Collegium Budapest. The author
hereby expresses his gratitude to all the above-mentioned people and institutes.
4. There are 21 prefectures, within them 180 counties, and within them 5,225 townships
in Sichuan. See Ren Jie: Sichuan—zhongguo xibu gailan (Sichuan—an Overview on Western
China), Beijing, Nationality Publishing House, 2000, p.15.
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5. They were: 1) Joint project with Maria Csanadi, “A Comparative Study on
Transformation of Party-state at County and Prefecture Levels in China”. Fieldwork
sites were in Shanxi, Sichuan and Jiangsu provinces. 2) “Innovation and Excellence in
Local Governance in China”, directed by professor Yu Keping, director of the China
Center for Comparative Politics and Economics. Field-works sites were in Sichuan,
Guizhou and Yunnan provinces. 3) “A Comparative Study on Political Reform at
Township and County Levels”, directed by Jingben Rong, editor in chief of Journal of
Comparative Economic and Social Systems. Fieldwork sites were in Henan and Jiangsu
provinces.
6. One of the most important paper on township elections is “The Politics of
Introducing Direct Township Elections in China” by Lianjiang Li, The China Quarterly, No.
171, Sep. 2002, pp. 704-723. Li thoroughly examined the background and the dynamics
of introducing a couple of cases of direct township elections in China in the late 1990s.
The findings of my own study in Sichuan and other provinces confirm some of Li’s
analysis. While Li shed lights on the interaction between local authorities and central
authorities on the initiatives of making township semi-competitive elections, I would
focus on the social, economic and political background of the localities where township
semi-competitive elections were implemented. One major point of Li’s that my
fieldwork confirms is that, in Li’s words, “It also suggests that the current cadre
management system may enable mid-level leaders to introduce political reform at a
lower level without seeking prior approval from their superiors”.
7. Sichuan has 84 million people living in 5,225 townships. The average population in a
township is 16,000 residents. See Ren Jie, op. cit., 2000, p. 15.
8. Generally, a township government has one governor and two vice-governors; in
cases of townships with large populations, three vice-governors sit in government.
9. The statistics were not publicly announced. This data came from the author’s
fieldwork.
10. Source: Interview.
11. See for example, Shi Weimin, Gongxuan yu zhixuan (Public Election and Direct
Election), Peking: Social Sciences Publishing House, 2000. He reported that in 1998-99,
Mianyang prefecture in Sichuan implemented semi-competitive elections at 11
townships for township vice-governor and governor.
12. Countless Chinese reports on this case are available. One of the most detailed
accounts could be found in Jiceng minzhu de zuixin tupo (A Latest Breakthrough in
Grassroots Democracy), edited by Yu Keping, Peking: Central Compilation and
Translation Press, 2000.
13. Source: interview in early April 2002 in Peking.
14. Source: interview in Sichuan.
15. Countless Chinese reports on this are available. One of the easiest ways to access
them is to visit www.ccrs.org.cn
16. See www.zaobao.com.sg. February 28th 2003.
17. See www.xinhuanet.com: China Tries Direct Election at Township Level, April 8th 2002.
18. Source: interview with Guiyang prefecture people’s congress, March 21st 2002.
19. Interview in late April 2002 in Peking. Interviewee did not give details about in
what county, at what township, and for what township position the semi-competitive
election was implemented.
20. One example for its controversial status: in the summer of 2002, central committee
of the Party issued a directive (document No. 12) warning localities not to implement
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direct elections in township elections at the end of that year, as some localities did in
1998-99.
21. There have been cases of semi-competitive elections taking place earlier, though
unknown to the public. For example, fieldwork found that at Lingshan township within
Bazhong prefecture, the township Party secretary was directly elected by Party
members living in that township. This was earlier than that in Yangji in Hubei, which
has been widely publicised.
22. Voting by the township people’s congress is a necessary process because the law on
organising local government demands it. See Office of Laws at State Council: Xinbian
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo changyong falü fagui quanshu (Newly Compiled Laws in
Peoples’ Republic of China), Peking: China Law Publishing House, 2001, p. 68; Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo difang geji renmin daibiao dahui he difang geji renmin zhengfu zuzhifa (Law
on Organising Local People’s Congress and Local Government at All Levels), article 21.
23. See regulations on township semi-competitive elections issued by Shizhong county
Party committee (document No. 51, May 12th 1998), by organisation department of
Ya’an prefecture Party committee (document No. 27, September 13th 2001), by Nanbu
county Party committee (document No. 64, November 12th 2001), by Bazhong
prefecture Party committee (document No. 44, November .20th 2001). 
24. Figures are the author’s estimates. Usually, there is a governor, two vice-governors,
one Party secretary, and three Party vice-secretaries (the township governor is one of
the vice-secretaries) at each township. 
25. See document No. 36 issued by the organisation department of Ya’an prefecture
Party committee on December 25th 2001 (Zhonggong Ya’an shiwei zuzhibu 2001 nian zuzhi
gongzuo zongjie).
26. The Election Commission for township elections is a provisional organisation
subordinated to county Party committee, aiming to supervise township elections that
happen once every three years. Usually, it includes county Party secretaries, main
cadres at the Organisation Department of the county Party committee, county
governors, and chairpersons of the county people’s congress.
27. Interviews in Ya’an and Bazhong prefectures.
28. In China, people working for authorities were categorised as cadres (ganbu). Cadres
at county and township authorities were those people whose salaries were covered by
the state budget. All other people outside the authorities were categorised as ordinary
citizens (laobaixing).
29. Primary candidates were not allowed to advertise, to criticise other competitors’
capabilities or programmes, to ask electors not to vote for others, etc.
30. In China, undergraduate education is a high level of education. Most people,
especially those in rural areas, do not go higher than senior high school. 
31. According to related laws, the township authorities should be re-elected once every
three years. This research examined elections in three election years in Sichuan: (late)
1995-(early) 1996; (late) 1998-(early) 1999; (late) 2001-(early) 2002.
32. With the exception of Buyun township semi-competitive elections.
33. The function of the enlarged Electoral College at Buyun township was different
from all other cases. It had to choose two candidates from all primary candidates. These
two candidates took part in the next step, in which all residents voted. The candidate
winning the majority resident vote was voted by township people’s congress to the
position of township governor. At Buyun township, the last part of the process was only
a formality. 
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34. “Intense” is a relative term. Compared to the fact that there had been no campaign
seen by voters before, it was intense. Compared to the campaign at the second time of
election (in 2001), it was also intense. Naturally, in this election, there were no
advertisements on the radio, on the television or in the newspapers. 
35. According to law and registration requirements, Buyun township had about 11,000
voters. However, more than 5,000 voters had migrated to urban areas inside and
outside the province to find jobs. 
36. Many reports on Buyun’s elections are available. Data here were from Shi Weimin, 
Gongxuan yu zhixuan, op. cit.
37. His two rivals obtained 31.5% and 17% votes respectively. According to the
regulations, if no one got more than 50%, a second round of voting would be organised,
in which the one who got most ballots would win.
38. Interviews in Shizhong county: 
39. Compared to the 1998 election, fewer voters attended the Buyun township
competitive election in 2001.
40. The author was at the township on December 31st 2001. Peasants told the author,
the one who was most likely to defeat the incumbent was a township resident but then
serving as a cadre in a neighbouring township. He was also the one who was in second
place in the competitive election in 1998. Interviews.
41. Interviews.
42. But he won with a very narrow margin, which was an unexpected outcome.
43. The enlarged electoral college consisted of county leadership, and ordinary cadres
and citizens. No position of township governor was open to semi-competitive election
in 1998 in Nanbu county.
44. They were township cadres, village cadres, and resident representatives selected by
village cadres.
45. There were a total 80 townships within the county.
46. See regulations issued by the county for procedures and way of calculating votes.
47. See Maria Csanadi, Party-states and their legacies in post-communist transformation
(Chinese version: Shuanxing: toushi xiongyali zhengdang-guojia tizhi, Changchun: Jilin
People’s Publishing House, 2003) for a detailed account of nomenklatura in Party-
states.
48. In the 21 interviews with ordinary residents of townships where semi-competitive
elections were implemented, to the question “Did you hope township governors and
vice-governors would be elected in a free and competitive way?” 17 interviewees
answered “Yes”; 4 interviewees answered “Do not have a clear idea about this”; no one
answered “No”. To the question “Did you demand of cadres at any level by phone, or
any oral or written message to implement free and competitive elections at your
township?”, all 21 interviewees answered “No”. In the 61 interviews with cadres, to the
question “Did any ordinary citizen ask you by phone, or any oral or written message to
implement free and competitive election at township?”, all 61 interviewees answered
“No”.
49. Interview. See also Lianjiang Li, The Politics of Introducing Direct Township Elections in
China.
50. Interview.
51. Interviews in Bazhong prefecture.
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52. Wen Wu, "Dui tiexi pian qu xiangcun zhaiwu qingkuang de diaocha ji sikao"
(Investigation and reflection on rural authorities’ debts in Tiexi region), Jinri Bazhong
(Bazhong Today), 12, 2001, p. 42.
53. Ibid.
54. Xiangcun huanjie xuanju gongzuo zongjie (Summary of Election Works at Rural Areas),
by Bazhong prefecture Party committee, December 20th 2001.
55. Interviews in Nanbu county: Detailed information on dates and frequencies and
scales of the complaints and demonstrations was not provided.
56. Interview.
57. Fu Wenchao tongzhi zai quanxian xiangzhen huanjie xuanju gongzuo huiyi shang de
jianghua (Comrade Fu Wenchao’s Speech at the Meeting on Township Election Works),
printed by general office of Nanbu county Party committee, October 26th 1998.
58. Interview.
59. Wei Hong tongzhi zai quanshi xiangcun huanjie gongtuigongxuan xinwen xuanchuan
gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua (Comrade Wei Hong’s Speech at the Meeting of News
Reporting Works on Competitive Elections at Rural Areas), propaganda department of
Ya’an prefecture Party committee, November 19th 2001.
60. I did not find the exact mechanism/strategy by which cadres emerging from semi-
competitive elections were able to obtain extra resources from peasants. I give an
account of the link between semi-competitive elections and attainment of extra funds
with some hesitation because of the lack of knowledge on exactly how it operated.
Nevertheless, since the Party archives frequently referred to it and the interviewed
cadres often mentioned it, I find it hard to ignore this link. 
61. According to Lianjiang Li, one motivation for local leaders to introduce township
semi-competitive elections, is the sustaining of their own careers. Since in poor regions
that lack resources, a cadre’s path to promotion through economic success is
impractical, some of them explore alternative paths to promotion by pioneering
political reforms such as township semi-competitive elections. (See Lijiang, Li, op. cit.).
A few of my interviewees did refer to it. The problem, however, is why political reforms
as controversial as this would be perceived as meritorious. 
62. Interviews in Shenzhen. In Shenzhen, the author did not hear reports of peasant
demonstrations, or other forms of complaint against the township authorities, etc. The
township authorities in this prefecture not only did not collect taxes from peasants, but
instead gave subsidies to most of them, thanks to the revenues from industrial and
commercial activities operating within the townships. However, the author does not
imply that there were no problems at Dapeng township. Nevertheless, from the
viewpoint of township authority, there was at that moment no problem needing to be
solved through competitive elections.
63. As mentioned before, Document No. 12 issued by the centre tried to restrict the
development of township competitive elections.
64. Interview. In Autumn 2001, Sichuan provincial Party committee organised a special
meeting discussing the issue of the coming township elections at the end of the year.
The meeting concluded with the issue of a document that urged each county within the
province (except for those in ethnic minority regions) to select at least one-third of its
townships to implement semi-competitive elections.
65. There are no official statistics on localities’ deficits, since localities are not allowed
to cover their expenditure with deficits according to regulations in China. However,
countless reports directly tell or indirectly hint to the public about the existence of
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huge deficits accumulated by localities. Data attained during fieldwork for the author’s
joint project with Maria Csanadi, “A Comparative Study on Transformation of Party-
state at County and Prefecture Levels in China” shows that, financial crisis in rural
areas in Sichuan was graver than in other two provinces—Shanxi and Jiangsu. 
66. In all of the counties and prefectures the author visited, there were cases of
peasants suing township authorities, and peasants, especially the younger generation,
migrating to urban areas or other provinces.
67. This is visible in most interviews.
68. Ya’an prefecture and Bazhong prefecture in which 100% of their townships semi-
competitive elections were implemented (as shown in Table 3) happen to be relatively
underdeveloped regions in Sichuan. Chengdu prefecture, where probably less than 10%
of its townships implemented semi-competitive elections is the most prosperous region
in the province. 
69. In local cadres’ words, old practice was characterised as “ to select cadres from a
small group of people by another smaller group of people”; new practice was
characterised as “to select cadres from a large number of people by another large
group of people”.
70. In Ya’an prefecture, the prefecture Party committee suggested inviting heads of
villager committees who were not yet Party members to join the Party. However,
changes in township Party committee nomenklatura over village positions were not the
unique consequence of township competitive elections. In many places, both inside and
outside Sichuan province, village free elections had already greatly weakened township
Party committee nomenklatura over village positions. The role played by township
semi-competitive elections in this respect was to facilitate the weakening or
withdrawing of township Party committee nomenklatura over village positions.
71. Interview. These changes, especially the conflicts between Party positions and non-
Party positions, are common at village level since competitive elections have been
introduced to villages in the 1990s. Countless reports on this type of conflict at village
level are available.
72. Interview.
73. Interview.
74. Interview.
75. In local cadres’ words, it was an “earthquake” among the cadres in the prefecture. 
76. Interviews.
77. On December 31st 2001, the author witnessed the vote and the calculation of the
ballot.
78. Interviews with cadres at Shizhong county authority. At the township during the
interviews, peasants expressed a strong resentment towards some of the incumbent’s
policies and their implementation with little transparency. In fact, some of the policies
were not within the control of the incumbent. They were directives from upper levels,
independent from him.
79. For example, tasks assigned to a township vice-governor in Nanbu county include:
tons and planting acres of grains, of cotton, or oil-bearing crops; forestation;
infrastructure construction for roads, irrigation, etc.; to prevent production accidents;
to collect a certain amount of tax, raise a certain amount of funds; to develop a certain
amount of TVEs; environment protection; birth control; civil affairs; religion;
education; public safety... See Nanbuxian fuxiangzhenzhang niandu fenguan gongzuo mubiao
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zerenshu (Goals must be achieved for each township vice-governor in Nanbu county,
Nanbu county government, 1999.
80. The cadre exchange programme in China is an institutionalised routine operation.
It has deep roots in the long history of imperial China. Cadre exchange was supposed to
prevent a cadre from forming a strong personal power network by constantly moving
him/her from one place to another. After 1949, the Chinese Party-state continued the
practice.
81. For example, the governor at Baoshi township elected in a competitive way in 1998
was shifted to the position of Party secretary at another township after serving in the
position of Baoshi township governor for the first of his would-be three years.
82. For example, in Qianjiang county within Hubei province, according to a local
resident’s investigation, 187 (thus 56.8%) freely elected heads of villagers committees
were “illegally” dismissed by township authorities (since according to written law on
relations between township and village authorities, township authorities do not have
the right to appoint and/or dismiss village cadres. However, in practice, most township
authorities have it with the practice of nomenklatura) in 1999-2001. Later, provincial
authority made the same investigation in the same county. Its conclusion was, 119
(thus 36.28%) heads of villagers committees were dismissed “without engaging in
proper legal procedures”. See Li Yong, “Qianjiang anliu” (Dark Wave in Qianjiang), in 
Caijing, No. 22, 2002.
83. For example, agricultural office, financial office, industries office, youth league
office, etc. are attached to township authority, but the personnel issue and main
activities at these offices were supervised by corresponding offices subordinated to
county authority. Township Party committee and government only have influence on
their routine operation.
84. For example, Buyun township was the case. Competitively elected governor could
do little to those organisations attached to Buyun township but under the supervision
of Shizhong county authority. See Zhang Jingmin, Wo dui Buyun zhixuan yiji xiangguan
wenti de sikao (My Reflection on Direct Election at Buyun Township and Related Issues),
January 21, 2001, working paper.
85. Interviews. Data on how many township cadres and in what way they were
passively handling directives from the county authority were not provided.
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